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A B S T R A C T
After a short introduction of cultural models underlying the prevention policies of business risks, the manuscript explains, through an unconventional reading filtered
by the systemic, socio-technical theoretical approach, how the competencies, as well as the role, of Italy’s HSE professionals evolved over years and what were the
challenges that were faced and the opportunities caught.
Starting from the description of the different cultural backgrounds owned by Italy’s Health, Safety, and Environment professionals, the paper explains how the HSE
profiles evolved according to both the legislative and the societal evolution. Further, it explains how the HSE professionals, thanks to the contribution of the unions,
the (industrials and practitioners) associations and the national (as well as regional) policies, evolved from the simple role of technicians to that of professionals and,
finally, will (hopefully) evolve into that of HSE managers.
1. Introduction
The HSE competencies composing the theoretical and experiential
background of Italy’s Health, Safety and Environment professionals has
evolved over years under a twofold influence, namely: the technolo-
gical and the societal evolution. Aim of this paper is to propose an
unconventional reading of this evolution filtered by the systemic, socio-
technical theoretical approach (which is considered, by the authors, as
being the most advanced conceptual thinking to date).
The analysis of cultural models underlying prevention policies of
business risks is based on the theoretical assumption that the organi-
zation is a cultural construct, i.e., a dynamic entity made up of the
cognitive constructs of the individuals composing the company fabric,
in which people are not only producers of actions, but also of (orga-
nisational and learning) change through the learning process (Argyris
and Schön, 1978; Smircich, 1983).
Cultural models, through which one might interpret the organisa-
tional behaviour, have followed, on the one hand, the technological
advancements, and, on the other hand, the socio-cultural development.
These models can be (coarsely) grouped into 5 main typologies,
namely: the blaming (or fatalistic) culture, the technological de-
terminism culture, the ergonomic culture (or that of the human factors),
the socio-technical (or integrated) culture, and, finally, the High
Reliability Organisation (HRO) culture, this last being an evolution of
the socio-technical culture (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2001). Fig. 1 sum-
marises their principal traits.
In the fatalistic culture accidents are due either to fate (Acts of God)
or inability of someone (who is the one to blame) to perform his/her
duty. From a risk prevention perspective this culture might be seen as a
non-culture as it contributes neither to the prevention activity nor to
the company maturity growth. The fatalistic culture, born at the be-
ginning of the industrial revolution, was followed by the technological
determinism culture. For it the technology is the centre of gravity of
everything and, as such, it has to impose the organisation of work.
Frederick Winslow Taylor (a mechanical engineer), founder of the
School of Scientific Management, in his book “The Principles of Scientific
Management” (Taylor, 1911), formulated the thesis both at the micro
level, in the relationship between the human and the machine (i.e.,
exasperation of the fragmentation of the work and its subordination to
the machine’s constraints), and at the macro level of the organization of
work, in the organisational functions (i.e., work division), which pri-
mary criteria was that of the technical specialisation.
The most radical criticism to this model (originated by the many
industrial disasters the history has recorded) was formulated by Charles
Perrow in his book “Normal Accidents” (Perrow, 1984). In the techno-
logical determinism culture, the accidents are due to the unexpected
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(and unidentified) complexity of the adopted technology. Perrow ar-
gued that the conventional engineering approach to ensuring safety,
i.e., building in more warnings and safeguards, fails because the (too)
high complexity of systems makes failures inevitable. He further argues
that the typical precautions, that add to an already high complexity,
may help creating new categories of accidents, thus increasing the
difficulty in preventing accidents. At Chernobyl, the tests (reckless, one
might add) of a new safety system helped to produce the meltdown of
the reactor (and subsequent fire and release of radioactive material).
The technological determinism culture has dominated for decades
up until the social aversion towards the industrial accidents and dis-
asters prevailed and forced a new paradigm to emerge. The importance
of the centrality of human beings in the (risk) performance of organi-
sations then started to take shape (in the 1970s). The organisation of
work soon started to be influenced by two distinctive and emerging
cultures: the ergonomic culture (primarily influenced by sociologists
and psychologists) and the socio-technical culture (primarily influenced
by organisation’s experts). The former concentrated on the ergonomic
aspects of work meant as “optimal” human-machine interaction, while
the latter assumed the equal relationship between the technology and
the behaviour of individuals (and groups). The ergonomic culture un-
balanced the centre of gravity towards the human being (in opposition
to the technology determinism culture where the technology was at the
centre). Yet, the ergonomic culture initially failed to account for the
organisational environment and dimension (and its importance) in the
risk prevention activity.
On the ergonomic side, the first cognitive theory on the “human
functioning” was formulated by Jens Rasmussen in his book
“Information Processing and Human-Machine Interface – An Approach to
Cognitive Engineering”, (Rasmussen, 1986). Rasmussen theory was soon
followed by that of Reason in his book “Human Errors” (Reason, 1990),
and that of Hollnagel in his book “Human reliability analysis: Context and
Control” (Hollnagel, 1993). In the ergonomic culture accidents occur
because of the poor ergonomic design of working environments. The
(limited) perspective offered by the ergonomic culture was theoretically
extended by Reason in his book “Managing the Risks of Organisational
Accidents” (Reason, 1997), in which Reason has included even the or-
ganisational dimension of risk prevention.
On the socio-technical side, the first theoretical foundation was
given by Burns and Stalker (1961) in their book “The management of
innovation”, in which they explained how the mechanistic and the
organic organizational forms can fit the stable and the dynamic en-
vironment respectively. The contribution of Burns and Stalker was
subsequently perfected by Emery and Trist with their manuscript “The
causal texture of organizational environment” (Emery and Trist, 1963),
transforming the two organisational forms proposed by Burns and
Stalker into four forms, thus offering an even more complete approach.
Trist some 20 years later proposed “The Evolution of socio-technical sys-
tems as a Conceptual Framework and an Action Research Program” (Trist,
1981). The strength of the socio-technical culture (that has allowed the
organisational approach associated to it of surviving till today) lies in
the consideration of the organization as a socio-technical system that
adapts to environmental pressures and takes advantage of the oppor-
tunities offered in a contingent logic. In the socio-technical culture
accidents are due to the (more or less conscious and intentional) vio-
lation of both social and technological protections.
The contribution of sociologists and psychologists in analysing high-
risk organisations allowed them to extend the socio-technical culture
beyond the limitations imposed by the underlying organisational ap-
proach proposed by Lawrence and Lorsch (1969) in their book “Orga-
nisation and environment”, i.e., the contingent adaptation of the orga-
nization to the environment, thus giving rise to the culture of the high
reliability organisations. The first sound theory of the High Reliability
Organisation (HRO) culture saw its light with Weick and Sutcliffe in
their book “Managing the Unexpected: Assuring High Performance in an
Age of Complexity” (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2001). To facilitate the un-
derstanding of the socio-technological perspective (system thinking) of
working environments, the terms Human, Technology and Organisation
(HTO) model has been introduced to refer to the three interrelated
elements and their effects on efficiency and performance, as well as on
safety (Rollenhagen, 2000; Karltunet al., 2014).
The aforementioned 5 cultural models, being a “reading tool” to
interpret companies’ prevention behaviour and not a tool themselves,
can be conveniently used to interpret the behaviour of both large and
SMEs companies. In the hereinafter, bearing in mind the 5 cultural
models and adopting as a reading filter the systemic, socio-technical
perspective, i.e., the fourth (and fifth) model, the manuscript explains
how the competencies, as well as the role, of Italy’s HSE professionals
evolved over years and what were the challenges that were faced and
the opportunities taken.
2. The health, safety and environment professionals: The Italian
perspective
In the Italian perspective, the Health, Safety & Environment (HSE)
professionals are certified specialists of different scientific disciplines
that deal with the prevention of different types of risks stemming from
the production of goods and services by private companies and public
institutions. More specifically, the HSE professionals are certified pro-
fessionals according to Law “Accordo Stato-Regioni” (State-Regions
Agreement – see Section 4) in the sense they have to go through an
educational program at the end of which they get a certificate (after
passing an exam).
Table 1 shortly summarises the cultural background typically
owned by Italy’s HSE professionals in relation to the type of risk(s) they
are required to prevent.
In terms of risk identification/recognition and prevention, each HSE
Fig. 1. Summary of the 5 cultural models of risk prevention.
Table1
Safety professional roles in Italian private companies and public institutions.
Types of risks Professionals
Hygiene and occupational diseases Medical doctors and hygienists
Occupational accidents & injuries Safety professionals (engineers, ergonomists, lawyers, chemists…)
Psycho-social risks (work-related stress & wellbeing) Medical doctors, psychologists, psychiatrists
Environmental pollution and disasters risks Environment professionals (engineers, chemists, biologists, physics, geologists, computer scientists, statisticians,
environment prevention professionals)
S. Colombo, et al. Safety Science 118 (2019) 724–739
725
professional deals with both aspects from their own perspective. This
approach, despite it allows to capitalise all the competencies hold by
the different professionalisms, might create coordination inefficiencies
as what might be a good choice for one type of professional, might turn
out not to be good for another. Clearly, (operational) problems and
inefficiencies might arise when both professional opinions are (legally)
important. For example, should a Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)
need to be chosen, what might happen is that the same PPE might be a
good choice for the safety professional, for example for mechanical
reasons (because assessed by an HSE professional holding an en-
gineering background), but a bad choice for the competent medical
doctor because of its health-related implications. The ultimate decision
is in charge to the HSE professional that might either decide to sub-
stitute the PPE (if already bought – with an increase of costs) or keep
using them exposing the company to a potential administrative and/or
criminal sanction.
Today, in the Health, Safety and Environment (HSE) areas of ex-
pertise, people are either employed as HSE professionals in private
companies and public institutions (as researchers, operating staff or
inspectors/auditors) or they practice the profession as practitioners at
the service of entrepreneurs and private companies. Yet, in Italy, the
specific competences of risk prevention developed over years, primarily
under the stimuli of scientific research, political decisions and labour
legislation. As far as the scientific stimulus is concerned, Italy pro-
foundly influenced the international (scientific and professional) com-
munity of hygiene and occupational diseases. According to Gochfeld
(2005), Bernardino Ramazzini (1713), with his world’s first book on
occupational diseases titled “De Morbis Artificum Diatriba” (i.e., literally
“Diseases of Workers”), can be considered the father of occupational
diseases. His book outlined the health hazards associated with chemi-
cals, metals, dust, repetitive or abrupt and sudden motions, odd pos-
tures, and other disease-causative agents encountered by workers in
more than fifty occupations. On the other hand, and as far as the po-
litical (and subsequently even the scientific) decisions are concerned,
Italy provided its significant contribution in the City of Milan (histori-
cally the place of production for “heavy industry”) starting from the
beginning the of the last century (1902), the “Clinica del lavoro” (The
Work Clinic) founded by Luigi Devoto, which is the oldest medical
structure worldwide. The goal of “The Work Clinic” (in the mind of
those who conceived it) was to study and prevent hygiene and occu-
pational diseases. Over years “The Work Clinic” has evolved and today
is the Department of Health Sciences of the “Università degli Studi di
Milano” (University of Milan). The Work Clinic, jointly with the trade
unions’ fights for occupational health and safety (see “Gruppo Omo-
geneo” later on in the text), other than influencing the specialisation in
occupational medicine has also influenced that of psychology, stimu-
lating the strand of risk prevention and safety behaviour. As far as the
other scientific disciplines involved in HSE prevention are concerned,
they were primarily influenced by the legislative framework. The Law
no. 300/1970 (see Table 4) represented a milestone as it has influenced
the legal disciplines to develop in favour of the HSE prevention. After
that the Law no. 186/1989 suppressed the previous degree in mining
engineering and introduced the “laurea in ingegneria per l’ambiente e il
territorio” (master degree in engineering for the environment and the
territory), thus putting the emphasis on (the protection of) the en-
vironment and the territory. Eventually, the Law no. 626/1994 stimu-
lated the organisational and sociological disciplines that introduced the
scientific strand of organisational safety (the former) and that of work
sociology (the latter). Finally, in 2004, under the initiative of a fistful of
professors (stemming primarily from the process industry domain –
chemical and nuclear), the Politecnico di Milano activated Italy’s first
master’s degree in prevention and safety engineering in the process
industry (still active today), thus concentrating the research knowledge
and experience, previously fragmented within the institution, under
one scientific strand.
As far as the labour legislation influence is concerned, Italy has a
long HSE tradition that finds its origin at the end of the 19th century
and that deserves a proper historical explanation (described in the
section below) to provide a better understanding of its influence on
Italy’s HSE professional evolution.
The weak point of the Italian tradition is the absence of an inter-
disciplinary perspective either by the different scientific disciplines or
by the empirical risk prevention approach within companies. On the
education side, universities masters are specialized courses, based on a
single scientific discipline. There is only one Master level course in
safety management offered by the University of Modena and Reggio
Emilia. On the practical risk prevention side, the medical doctor, spe-
cialized in occupational diseases (the so-called “medico competente” –
competent medical doctor) that might be either an external consultant
or an internal function (at company discretion), provides health ser-
vices to workers typically without (a proper) coordination with the
company HSE professional (that, similarly, might be either an internal
or an eternal consultant at company discretion).
3. The evolution of the Italian HSE legislation
Italy has begun to regulate the risk prevention market and the HSE
practice since the end of the 19th century. Table 2 summarises the main
labour-related Laws that influenced the HSE area of business in the
Italian enterprises during the Italian kingdom. These Laws were suffi-
ciently far-sighted to the point that their effects are still influencing
today’s practice.
As far as the voluntary insurance of workers is concerned, the first
company that insured its workers dates back to the end of the 19th
century, to be precise in 1881. To strengthen the increasing awareness
of Italian enterprises towards the importance of taking care of their own
workers, in April 1892 the Italian Association of Industrialists was
created in Milan with the specific and declared goal of preventing
Table 2
Main health, safety & environment laws during the kingdom of Italy.
Year Law number Content
1883 The creation of the “Cassa Nazionale di Assicurazione per gli Infortuni degli Operai sul Lavoro” (National Insurance Fund for Workers’ Accidents at
Work) for insuring workers against occupational accidents on a voluntary basis (a public body)
1898 80 The imposition of the compulsory insurance for the occupational accidents to all industrial enterprises (initially limited to male workers and
subsequently extended to women and young workers)
1906 380 The creation of the “Ispettorato del Lavoro (IL)” (Inspectorate of Labour), a public body of labour inspectors, under the direction of the Ministry
of Labour
1927 530 The creation of the “Medico di Fabbrica” (Factory Doctor), i.e., the company medical doctor, and the compulsory periodic medical examination
for each worker to ensure the protection against hygiene risks – compulsory for all companies
1933 The merge of the “Cassa Nazionale di Assicurazione per gli Infortuni degli Operai sul Lavoro” with some private insurance companies into the
“Istituto Nazionale per l’Assicurazione degli Infortuni sul Lavoro (INAIL)” (National Institute for Occupational Accident Insurance – a public body)
– compulsory for all workers
1942 262 Civil Code, art.2089 The imposition to the entrepreneur “to prevent workers from occupational health diseases and accidents and protect their physical integrity and the
moral personality”
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accidents at work. Insurance for occupational accidents and diseases
became compulsory for all companies on 1898 with the introduction of
Law no. 80. This insurance from the 1898 till 1932 was stipulated with
the “Cassa Nazionale di Assicurazione per gli Infortuni degli Operai sul
Lavoro” (National Insurance Fund for Workers’ Accidents at Work), and
from 1933 onwards (up until today) with the “Istituto Nazionale per
l’Assicurazione degli Infortuni sul Lavoro (INAIL)” (National Institute for
Occupational Accident Insurance), which is a public body.
In 1927 it became compulsory for all companies to create a com-
petent medical doctor function (either internal or external, at the
company’s discretion) which was charged with the periodic medical
examination of each worker to prevent hygiene risks.
As far as the knowledge, skills and competences are concerned,
throughout the entire Italian economic development and up until the
end of World War II, the HSE technicians, working both in the private
and public sector, were primarily focused on the prevention of major
accidents1 and diseases, and trained to do so. Their knowledge, skills
and competences were then almost exclusively of a technical nature and
primarily focused to prevent mechanical, electrical, fire and explosion
and health-related risks. Of the HTO-related knowledge and skills they
primarily developed the technological- and human-related aspects,
limiting their approach to the organisational side of the risk to a tacit,
heuristically-based approach (informally handed on and learnt on-the-
job over years). More specifically, the health-related knowledge and
skills were limited to the occupational hygiene part and both the er-
gonomic (cognitive and anthropometric) and psycho-social aspects (i.e.,
stress and wellbeing) were completely ignored. Further, the skills in
applying HTO knowledge and skills, as well as in using the available
tools, were specific and limited to the extent necessary to solve the
problems of the company where the single technician was employed as
the mobility was very low (i.e., the labour market of HSE professionals
was substantially absent). Factory doctors in this respect made an ex-
ception as, since from the beginning, they have met almost all of the
elements that characterise a profession, namely:
• The possession of a Master Diploma (of 2 years);• Success at the compulsory state examination for professional qua-
lification;• Registration in the national professional register (subject to the ac-
ceptance of deontological rules).
The professional register simplified and fostered the sharing of ex-
periences and innovations, thus allowing them to be specialists with a
deep, wide-ranging and up to date technical knowledge. Their status of
experts in the prevention and treatment of hygiene and occupational
diseases was widely recognized in private companies as well as in
public institutions.
In 1946 Italy transformed from a kingdom into a republic and that
change, thanks to the precepts introduced by the constitution, benefited
(at least from a legislative standpoint) even the quality of workplaces.
Table 3 summarises the main labour-related Laws that were in-
troduced in Italy after the transformation of Italy from a kingdom into a
republic.
The practical effect of the legislation on the prevention of health-
related risks was extremely disappointing. In the twenty years after the
World War II Italy experienced an economic boom. And in that same
period, Italian companies recorded some 23 million injuries and 82.000
deaths, namely 4.000 deaths per year, which translates into an average
of more than 18 deaths per day (on a 220 working days/year basis of
calculation).
With hindsight, the main limit of the legislation has been the lack of
inclusion of workers’ rights in the prevention of risks. In addition, the
activity of the public inspectors in the three HSE areas was weak as:
• The number of field inspectors and the financial resources to control
systematically Italian companies were inadequate to cope efficiently
with the negative health and safety situation of Italian companies;• The inspection approach was repressive as the non-compliances
were filed as criminal penalties and a criminal trial automatically
activated (inspectors were, and still are, judicial policemen).
The increase of sanctions did not cause immediate criminal trials,
due to the bureaucracy of the Italian justice system. Sanctions, espe-
cially those of mild severity, were “parked” in a limbo of the Criminal
Court and, in many cases, the criminal trials exceeded the expiration
time specified for that type of offence and consequently the occupa-
tional crimes went unpunished.
As a result, the behaviour of companies was to concentrate their
own efforts on the formal (paperwork) demonstration that all HSE as-
pects were appropriately dealt with and compliant with the Law(s) (i.e.,
hiding their HSE problems behind formally impeccable HSE reports
instead of requiring help and support to the authorities to correct
them). In short, the repressive approach contributed only in a (very)
limited way to the prevention of risks (of all types) in Italian companies.
Besides, despite the fact that the legislative framework was suffi-
ciently developed to induce companies to devote part of their attention
and efforts to the prevention of risks, a prevention culture was anything
but flourishing at the time, as was demonstrated by the fact that en-
trepreneurs and top managers made risk prevention subordinate to the
production imperative. To demonstrate this approach, the policy widely
adopted by companies was to monetize workers’ health: their salary
was proportional to the workers’ risk exposure level (i.e., the job held).
This policy was enshrined by national collective contracts of employ-
ment that explicitly mentioned the amount of the salary meant to cover
the risk faced by the worker (Onofri, 1955; Addaria, 1976). Point 1 of
Italy’s national collective workers’ labour agreement operating in the
chemical industry provides an example: “workers assigned to harmful,
dangerous and burdensome works will be paid with a special allow-
ance, proportionate to the harmfulness, dangerousness and burden-
someness of working conditions” (Contratto nazione di lavoro dei chi-
mici, 1947). The concrete application of the monetization of workers’
health resulted in dividing chemical workers into three groups, each of
them paid with a specific risk-related allowance, namely: 12 Italian lira
per hour for group 1; 7 Italian liras for group 2; 5 Italian liras for group
3. In this context, the role and importance of HSE technicians and
factory doctors were undervalued and they were underemployed. Their
business function was limited by entrepreneurs and managers to the
formal (paperwork) demonstration that all HSE aspects were dealt with
in compliance with the Law(s). For this reason, the HSE professionals
played their roles by emphasising a technical approach and secondary
prevention,2 i.e., they used their safety and occupational medicine
competencies as social control tools of the work environment.3
While the aforementioned approach was preferred by the vast ma-
jority of companies (especially SMEs), in the same period a counter-
trend was about to start up by a restricted number of large Italian
companies that set up voluntary health and safety services operated by
full time technicians whose activity was, primarily, to check both the
safety of machines and the health and hygiene of workplaces (albeit
1 By “major accidents” is meant those industrial accidents involving dan-
gerous chemicals and posing a significant threat to humans and the environ-
ment, causing huge economic losses and disrupting sustainable growth. Put
differently, the major accidents are those meant to be prevented by the
European Directive 82/501/EEC.
2 Please refer to the distinction between the primary and the secondary pre-
vention in the definition explained later on in the manuscript.
3 By “social control tools of the work environment” is meant the use of oc-
cupational data (produced by the safety technician and the factory doctor) to
influence company decisions and behavior to improve the working conditions.
S. Colombo, et al. Safety Science 118 (2019) 724–739
727
strictly in compliance with the Law).
At the time these technicians held a medium level of qualification4
(and remuneration) and their role was in the staff line, under the
hierarchical authority of either the Production or the Human Resources
Director.
The reaction of workers to the aforementioned unsafe working
conditions was tough and the trade unions struggled to face the requests
of workers to have healthier and safer working conditions, as well as to
refuse the monetisation policy of paying for risk exposure. The result of
the social conflict was the disruption of the previous, traditional ap-
proach towards risk prevention that favoured the technical perspective
and the unilateral intervention of company’s HSE experts, excluding
any contribution of the workers.
The rationalisation of the workers’ experiences is summarized in the
following four “principles”:
(1) Health is not for sale, namely: the production technologies and
processes are to be designed and operated with respect for workers’
health and safety;
(2) Primary risk prevention (proactive), based on direct observations
by workers about the dangers and harmfulness of their work en-
vironment, is to be preferred to secondary risk prevention (re-
active)5; the primary risk prevention is managed by “Gruppi Omo-
genei” (Homogeneous Groups) of workers exposed to the same risks
in the work environment;
(3) Workers cannot delegate risk prevention unrestrictedly to HSE
professionals (i.e., the RSPP), to the competent medical doctors
and, more generally, to any experts;
(4) Health and safety are not only individual but also collective rights.
The risk analysis must favour the group of workers exposed to same
risk(s), the so-called “Gruppo Omogeneo6” (Homogeneous Group).
The application of these principles allowed the approach to risk
analysis to change and to include workers’ viewpoints and experience
(“direct observation”), thus enriching and widening the perspective and
stimulating the creation of new research approaches and tools.
Direct observation was based on four homogeneous groups of
workers, namely:
• Group 1 was monitored according to the general harmfulness of the
working environment: temperature (too hot, too cold), light, hu-
midity, noise, and ventilation exposure;• Group 2 was monitored according to the specific harmfulness of the
working environment: gas, dust, vapour, vibration and radiation
exposure;• Group 3 recorded the muscle-related fatigue required by the work
activity;• Group 4 recorded the “fatica industriale” (industrial fatigue), i.e., the
work-related stress, required by the working activity7;
Data obtained through direct observation by the homogenous
groups were recorded in:
• “il registro dei dati ambientali” (the register of environment data)
which reported all data for each working area and harmful factor;• “il registro dei dati biostatistici” (the register of biostatistical data)
which reported all data on workers’ health, included those recorded
by the “medico competente” (competent medical doctor) (Righi,
1992).
The objective, factual approach was integrated by the worker-
centred, subjective approach in analysing injuries and work-related
stress and wellbeing. Amongst the new tools created by competent
medical doctors from workers’ experience to satisfy workers’ requests
were toxicological sheets, environmental investigations, and targeted
health checks. Their application led to the standardization of the
methodologies for risk investigation amongst competent medical doc-
tors.
Workers claimed their right to participate both in analysing and
inspecting the production processes and the labour organization to
identify embedded and cross functional risks. The results of the risk
analyses were required to be submitted to the discussion and to the so-
called “validazione consensuale” (consensual validation) of the assembly
of all company workers (Berlinguer, 1973).
Experiences of the fights of workers for their health were reflected
in the law no. 300/1970 (see Table 4). Thanks to that law the mon-
etization of risks was eliminated, and health and safety became matters
to be negotiated in the national labour agreement by trade unions with
entrepreneurs (Briante, 1977).
The company was forced by Law to keep, for each employee, both
the “libretto individuale di rischio” (individual risk book) and the “libretto
sanitario individuale” (individual health book).
The HSE principles, rationalised by workers to protect their health
and safety, were in line with the European Directive 89/39/EEC on
“The introduction of measures to encourage improvements in the safety and
health of workers at work”. The introduction of this Directive was jus-
tified as the numbers of occupational accidents and diseases were still
too high and their social and economic costs were too high to be ac-
cepted both by European society and the enterprises at large (as their
competitiveness would have been put at risk).
The two main objectives to pursue set by the European
Commission’s action framework, for the period 1994–2000, were as
follows:
• Ensuring that workers were protected from risks of occupational
accidents and diseases;
Table 3
Main safety & health laws of the Italian republic: 1946–1966.
Year Law number Content
1947 The Italian Constitution
Art. 41
“The business activity can’t be managed in contrast with the social values and security, or to cause damage to the human health, safety, freedom and
dignity”
1955 547 Technical standards to protect machines and Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)
1964 185 The first Law transposing the European Directive 96/29, and ruling the protection of the health of workers and the general public against the
dangers arising from ionizing radiation and defining the duties of the “competent medical doctor”
4 By “medium level of qualification” is meant the possession of a high school
diploma.
5 By “primary risk prevention” is meant a proactive approach, whose action
(i.e., the definition and implementation of preventive measures) is guided by
weak signals, i.e., by leading indicators, and not by negative, factual results
(i.e., accidents and injuries) as is the “secondary (reactive) risk prevention"
approach.
6 The “Gruppo Omogeneo” (Homogeneus Group) is the group of workers ex-
posed to the same risk(s), although they cover different jobs in the company.
7 A vivid example of the “fatica industriale” (industrial fatigue) is reported in
the diary of Simon Weil (1965), during his work experience at the Renault
Factory, where the work was organised on the basis of Taylor’s scientific
management principles.
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• Preventing that the health and safety of workers be jeopardized by
the free movement of goods and people.
The transposition of the European Directive 39391/89/EEC was
formalized into the two Laws no. 626/1994 and no. 81/2008 (Table 4).
The Law no. 626 introduced a paradigm shift (it was a shock for
entrepreneurs and employers), to the role and, above all, the associated
responsibilities of the HSE technician. Actually, before the introduction
of the Law no. 626 the HSE technician was, as head of the HSE aspects,
responsible for all HSE-related (negative) effects the production system
would have had on the workers, the society and the environment (i.e.,
for all the effects of non-market risks). With the introduction of the Law
no. 626, the HSE technician transformed into the RSPP (Head of the
Prevention and Protection Service), i.e., an HSE professional, that,
contrary to its misleading title, was not responsible anymore for the
HSE-related (negative) effects of the company as the responsibilities
were transferred (with possibility of delegation) directly to the en-
trepreneur and/or the employer (today it is still so). Thus, looking at
the HSE profile from the ENSHPO perspective, both the HSE technician
and the HSE professional (meant as RSPP) were head of the HSE
function, with the significant difference that the former was liable for
the HSE-related (negative) effects on workers, society and the
environment and the latter was not anymore (despite preserving its role
as head of the function).8 As will be explained later on in this manu-
script, Law no. 626 transformed the HSE technician into an HSE pro-
fessional in the sense it transformed the HSE expert from a role of re-
sponsibility to that of consultancy (still compulsory). The legislator
made this choice to stop the opportunistic behaviour (i.e., the bad
practice) of bad entrepreneurs and employers to resort to the scapegoat
model (Bonazzi, 1983), assigning the responsibility of HSE aspects to
HSE technicians without giving them a sufficient budget to prevent HSE
risks, thus transforming the role of the HSE technician into that of a
scapegoat for the company's HSE inefficiencies, behaviour that resulted
in criminal convictions of some HSE experts instead of those who had
real responsibility (i.e., entrepreneurs/employers and top managers).
Table 5 summarises the legislative norms that reflect the heritage of
trade unions’ struggles on the health and safety risk prevention.
The tough reaction of workers’ trade unions towards the risk pre-
vention approach has had a relevant impact on HSE technicians.
Table 4
Main safety and health laws of the Italian republic: 1970–2018.
Year Law
number
Content Dealt with by
1970 300, art.9 “Worker have the right to control the application of norms for the risk prevention of
occupational injuries and diseases through their labour union representatives. Workers have
the right to promote applied research and tools to protect their health and physical integrity”
• Unions’ Representative (not yet the RLS – see table 5)
1978 833 The health care reform establishes that health is a fundamental social right of each
citizen. The reform assigns to each Italian Region the occupational injuries and
illnesses prevention and the control of the compliance to norms by enterprises through
its “Azienda Sanitaria Locale (ASL)” (Local Health Authority) and its “Servizio per la
Prevenzione e la Sicurezza negli Ambienti di Lavoro (SPSAL)” (Service for the Prevention
of Occupational Health and Safety).
1988 175 The Law transposes the European Directive 82/501/CEE (known as Seveso Directive)
on relevant human and environmental risks (i.e., known as major accidents)
• HSE technician (who, in contrast with the HSE professional –
i.e., the RSPP profile, had direct civil and criminal liability)
1990 142 The Law establishes the “Agenzia Regionale per la Prevenzione Ambientale (ARPA)”
(Regional Agency for Environmental Protection), the Regional Agency (one for each of
the 19 Italian Regions1) for the prevention and control of environmental risks
1991 277 The Law transposes a set of European Directives and revises the medical doctor role
(i.e., the Factory Doctor) and requiring a 4 years specialisation on Occupational
medicine, thus transforming the Factory Doctor into the “Medico Competente”
(Competent Medical Doctor)
1994 626 The Law transposes a set of European Directives that establishes the fundamental
criteria to organize the risk prevention in private companies. The Law established the
new role of HSE technician, the so-called “Responsabile del Servizio di Prevenzione e
Protezione (RSPP)” (Head of the Prevention and Protection Service)
1995 The voluntary Eco-Management and audit Scheme (EMAS) of the European regulation
n. 1836/1993 entered definitely into force
• HSE Professional (i.e., the RSPP)
2006 152 The (reorganizational) Law complying with all the European Directives on
environment regulation from 1975 to date and reorganising Italy’s environmental
legislation
• HSE Professional (i.e., the RSPP)
2008 81 The Law improves and strengthens the previous 626 norm and the organization of HSE
prevention. It defines clearly the roles of all actors involved in the company, including
the HSE professional (i.e., the RSPP) and the competent medical doctor
• HSE Professional (i.e., the RSPP)• Competent Medical Doctor
2008 133 The Law establishes the “Istituto Superiore per la Protezione e la Ricerca Ambientale
(ISPRA)” (Higher Institute for Environmental Protection and Research). The aim of
ISPRA is: to coordinate the action of all 19 regional ARPA; to be the Italian link of the
European Environment Agency (EEA) and to support the “Ministero dell’Ambiente e
della tutela del Territorio e del Mare” (Italian Ministry of the Environment, Soil and Sea
Protection), with its research and monitoring activities.
2011 231 The Law establishes the new independent collective role of the “Organismo di vigilanza”
(Surveillance Body), an independent body internal to the company, responsible to
audit the company organization of risks prevention and its compliance with the HSE
legislation
• Surveillance Body
1 The Italian Regions are 20 but when it comes to the HSE aspects the Trentino-Alto Adige Region is substituted by the two autonomous provinces of Trento and
Bolzano.
8 More precisely the liability of the HSE professional (i.e., the RSPP) still hold
but only for negligent behaviour.
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4. The influence of the legislation on the organisation of risk
prevention
In 1970 they founded in Milan, on a voluntary basis, the first Italian
association named “Associazione Italiana fra Addetti alla Sicurezza
(AIAS)” (Italian Association of Safety Employees), which lately changed
its name to “Associazione professionale Italiana Ambiente e Sicurezza
(AIAS)” (Italian Professional Association for Environment and Safety).
Its statutory model was derived from the existing professional asso-
ciations in countries with a long and advanced industrial tradition such
as the United States and the United Kingdom. The mission of the
Association was (and it still is today) to improve the HSE competencies
required by the complexities of business and so to turn technicians into
HSE professionals. AIAS is aware that professionalism is the essential
source of organizational identity and the independence of its associates
in the enterprises.
The technological innovation required to broaden the technical HSE
competencies from the knowledge and skills concerning the interaction
between machines and the individual behaviour of workers to a much
broader understanding of the risks associated with the technological
processes and their potential social and environmental consequences
both within the company perimeter and outside the company perimeter
(so-called major accidents).
The increase in the Italian HSE legislation, influenced by the in-
creasingly frequent regulations created by the European Commission,
has required technicians/professionals to have a complete knowledge
and a continuous update of the legislative framework, as well as the
adaptation of the skills necessary to apply the precepts stemming from
the new regulations, and then to interpret their application to the
specific working environment of the company.
Since the beginning the main activity of the AIAS association has
been the technical and legal education and training of its members, the
majority of whom still hold only a high school diploma. AIAS’s ap-
proach has initially neglected the behavioural and organisational as-
pects.
Laws no. 626, 81 and 231 defined the latest competency require-
ments by HSE professionals (i.e., the RSPP). Currently, they are ex-
pected to be made up of the knowledge and skills necessary to design
and manage a “Sistema di Gestione della Sicurezza sul Lavoro (SGSL)”
(Occupational Safety Management System) in order to make it com-
pliant with the prevention principles and organizational requirements
of Laws no. 81 and 231.
The prevention principles in the mind of the legislator and under-
lying these two Laws are as follows:
• The improvement of workers’ health improves the economics of
enterprises and the public finance;• The protection of workers’ health must be a value of all company
cultures;• Risk prevention must be on a professional dimension and be an
organizational responsibility of managers and supervisors;• Risks must be identified and evaluated technically and economic-
ally; their elimination must be planned jointly with the planning and
designing of the business activities;• Risk prevention is a both a multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary
process that must be shared with the participation of workers.
According to the aforementioned Laws the SGSL must define and
formalize:
• The responsibilities of all role- and function-holders who form the
structure of the company, namely: entrepreneurs, managers, su-
pervisors, workers and their HSE representatives;• The procedures that rule the working activities in such a way that
the HSE precepts are respected;• The identification and evaluation of risks and the plan to eliminate
them, formally called “Documento di Valutazione dei Rischi (DVR)”
(Risk Evaluation Report);• The analysis of the HSE training needs of employees and the asso-
ciated training plan to satisfy them.
For HSE professionals (i.e., the RSPP) designing the SGSL means:
• To integrate HSE responsibilities into the existing job descriptions
managed by the HR manager;• To formalize HSE procedures, adopting the ISO 45001:2018 stan-
dard (or the Italian UNI-INAIL guidelines, which are based on it) and
the ISO 14001:2015 standard, and supporting the integration of the
existing procedure into the quality control process (as required by
the UNI EN ISO 9001:2015).
This organizational knowledge and the related skills should be used
by the HSE professionals (i.e., the RSPP) to advise the entrepreneur and
his first line of managers. As anticipated earlier in the manuscript, the
Table 5
Workers’ health and safety rights granted by the Italian legislation.
Law No. Rights gained
− 626: art. 19
– 81: art. 47–48-49–50
The right to be represented: the new role of the “Rappresentante dei Lavoratori per la Sicurezza (RLS)” (Workers Representative for Health and Safety)
Workers are entitled to elect their health and safety representatives (RLS) (their number varies according the size and nature of the company).
The RLS performs two functions:• Cooperates with the entrepreneur regarding the risk evaluation, the safety plan, the training courses, the choice of the HSE professional(s);• Monitors health and safety conditions of workplaces and the health surveillance plan.
− 626: art. 21
– 81: art. 36
The right to be informed about health and safety aspects.
The entrepreneur/employer is obliged to inform employees about:• General and specific risks of the workplace;• Procedures regarding first aid, firefighting, and evacuation from workplaces;• The organization of the safety unit and health surveillance.
The communication of the data required by the Law (i.e., health and safety statistics and relevant risk data) must be provided by the entrepreneur
and shared with the RLS in the “Riunione Periodica” (Periodical Health and Safety Meeting), at least once a year.
− 626: art. 22;
– 81: art. 2, 37, and 51
The right to be trained on health and safety aspects.
The entrepreneur/employer must ensure a sufficient and adequate health and safety training to each employee (including the RLS) when s/he is
hired or required to change role, as well as when new technologies are introduced. The health and safety training must be regularly updated
according to the State-Regions agreement (see Table 6).
A new joint body, the so-called “organismo paritetico” (Joint Body), made up of trade unions and entrepreneurs’ associations representatives (at
regional level) is to be created. The Joint Body is entitled to:• Design and deliver health and safety training courses;• Collect the best health and safety practices and disseminate them within the companies;• Solve controversies regarding the correct application and protection of health and safety information and training rights.
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role of the RSPP is defined by the Law no. 81 as a consultant and not as
the responsible person (as it was before, with the previous Law(s)). The
new role of the HSE professional underlines that his authority is based
only on his multidisciplinary/interdisciplinary professionalism that can
be improved thanks to the existence of an adequate “market” and offer
of HSE education and training.
More specifically, as far as the organisational dimension is con-
cerned, Law no. 81 defines the HSE professional as a consultant to the
entrepreneur, his managers and supervisors. Yet, it leaves discretion to
decide:
• Where to place the HSE unit and its professionals in the organiza-
tional structure;• How to design the RSPP role and, consequently, to define compe-
tencies required of the role’s holder(s).
Italian companies have mostly chosen to design a staff unit, the
Health, Safety and Environment (HSE) Service to advise on the pre-
vention and management of HSE-related risks. This organizational
choice is in line with the one adopted by the majority of European
companies that, in some cases, include in the unit even the quality
activities and, in some exceptional cases, even the security activities
(the QHSSE area). Indeed, the integration of the QHSSE model, given
that QHSSE activities all have the same objective, i.e., preventing non-
market risks and their social costs, might turn out to be significantly
more efficient as it benefits from (potentially significant) economies of
scale. Furthermore, QHSSE prevention processes are cross functional,
involving all company activities, and potentially conflicting with them,
if dealt with in isolation from one another (as might easily happen for
safety and security aspects).
The most crucial problem in designing the (Q)HS(S)E prevention
system to cash in on the benefit from the desired economies of scope
associated with the reduction of costs) lies in its integration within
other existing operating systems. Particularly, this is true for:
• The performance appraisal system to include (Q)HS(S)E responsi-
bilities for all roles’ holders;• The budgeting system to allocate financial resources to plan tech-
nical-economic activities to eliminate and prevent risks;• The training system to include prevention risks and (Q)HS(S)E
courses for all relevant employees.
The integration is a challenging activity because the aforementioned
operating systems are managed and under the responsibility of the HR
manager and the Controller. These roles have demonstrated in the past
their managerial nature and their importance for the business. Yet,
according to the research experience of the authors (Casai et al., 2018),
they have demonstrated their reluctance to modify their operating
systems and to share their responsibilities with the (Q)HS(S)E profes-
sional(s).
Law no. 81/2008 forces the entrepreneur to organize the internal
HSE unit by hiring an HSE professional as a full time RSPP with a
permanent labour contract, if the enterprise runs specified risks (listed
in art.31) or it is above a certain size (i.e., more than 200 employees). In
all other cases, the Law offers three alternatives to organize the HSE
units. The first one is the same as the compulsory one, i.e., hiring an
HSE professional as permanent staff, but as a voluntary action of the
entrepreneur. The second alternative is to buy HSE consultancy services
from an external HSE professional who must be appointed as an ex-
ternal part time RSPP. This choice is compulsory when the entrepreneur
doesn’t hold HSE skills and competencies (which is a typical situation
for SMEs). This second alternative can be achieved also by a pool of
enterprises that agree to externalise their HSE competencies to an ex-
ternal professional; in this case each company has to sign its own in-
dependent contract with the chosen HSE professional. The third alter-
native is devoted to SMEs with less than 5 employees: in this case the
entrepreneur can be the job holder of the RSPP role and, in doing so, he
is forced to attend the compulsory training courses designed for the
role.
As far as the consultancy dimension of the HSE role is concerned,
and with respect for the service management literature (Gronroos,
2000), the HSE professional/manager role can be designed in two ra-
dically different ways, namely: the reliever or the enabler consultant for
HSE services (Normann, 1984) (see Fig. 2).
The HSE professionals are reliever consultants when they provide
specialized HSE solutions and services to their internal clients based on
their expertise. The professional behaviour and attitude in the provision
of the service to these internal clients can either be proactive or “on
demand”. The strong point in favour of the reliever approach is the
provision of efficient solutions by deeper experts. The weak point is the
minimal involvement and participation of its internal clients that lead
to two consequences:
• The lack of HSE learning by those who are exposed to the risks and,
as a consequence, their (unconscious) dependence on the HSE re-
liever for all their HSE duties. The dependency causes the rapid fall
of in requests for support, because managers, supervisors and op-
erators do not develop the knowledge and skills to identify risks,
thus rapidly tending to behave in a non-HSE-oriented way;• The delay both in building a sound and common HSE culture at
company level and in the mindful acceptance of HSE responsibilities
by the entrepreneur, managers, supervisors and workers.
On the other hand, the enabler consultancy “co-produces” risk
prevention with its internal clients. The strong points in favour of the
enablers are as follows:
• The (faster) growth of a common HSE culture at company level;• The participation of and co-production by employees in the pre-
vention of risks and the mindful acceptance of HSE responsibilities,
especially by those holding managerial roles.
The weak (organisational) point is that some HSE activities, such as
the monitoring of the compliance with the HSE procedures and beha-
viours, are responsibilities which cannot be shared between the HSE
function and its internal clients.
From the standpoint of the authors, the enabler approach is pre-
ferable as it fosters the growing of a mature HSE culture. Yet, given the
weak point of this approach, a possible organisational solution is to ask
the HSE professional to adopt a “double hats” approach, namely:
• To behave as reliever when HSE problems at stake are regulated by
the Law or for those problems for which specific technical and/or
legal competencies are required;• To behave as enabler in all other cases especially when it is neces-
sary to create an interdisciplinary approach centred on the internal
client and aimed at fostering a mature HSE culture).
Fig. 2. The reliever vs. enabler profile as per Normann (1984).
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To gain a managerial status in the company and be efficient, the
HSE unit ought then to be managed in a hybrid way, namely: with a
reliever approach when it comes to non-shareable activities (such as the
audit and compliance activities), and with an enabler approach when it
comes to shareable activities (such as the consultancy to search for the
best solutions). This organizational choice is the best to build a common
HSE culture and, in turn, will assure more efficient HSE behaviours and
results.
Broadly speaking, Italian RSPPs are (still primarily) playing the role
of the reliever for the following reasons:
• Professional competencies held are mainly legal and technical ones;• The reliever is the role that gives a professional identity consistent
with those of colleagues operating in the functional organizational
form (which is the one most adopted by Italian companies), based
on the division of labour based on technical competencies;• The reliever is also the role more consistent with the criminal li-
abilities established by Law no. 81/2008. This law defines the RSPP
as a consultant whose criminal liabilities are only professional ones
(lack of competence/experience, negligence, and disregard of safety
laws), while in the case of an injury and/or a death, the sole crim-
inally responsible is the entrepreneur/employer. The RSPP is crim-
inally liable only “if the injury/death is objectively due to a dan-
gerous situation that the RSPP should have the obligation to know
and communicate to the entrepreneur/employer” (as per the sen-
tence of the Criminal Court “Cassazione Penale, sez IV 27/01/2011n.
2814”).
In short, the knowledge and skills of the HSE managers, as well as
those of the HSE unit, are to be(come) those of the (traditional and well
known) managerial roles (and units), namely:
• To plan and to control a process to get specific objectives;• To speak the same business language;• To negotiate for resource allocations and for “do what, for what”
agreements;• To economically measure activities;• To co-produce HSE services (and find the best HSE solutions) with
internal clients by putting themselves in their clients’ shoes to un-
derstand their problems.
5. HSE education and supply of services
The education standard to start an HSE professional (RSPP) career
has been set higher from 1994 (Law no. 626) to 2008 (Law no. 81),
transforming the requirement from the possession of a high school di-
ploma into that of a university bachelor’s diploma. Since 2011 the
Italian State and its Regions have agreed to define compulsory courses
that entrepreneurs, managers, RSPP, workers and their RLS re-
presentative must attend in order to be compliant with the require-
ments of Law no. 81 and to give concrete form to workers’ rights to HSE
information and training. The agreement, the so-called “Accordo Stato-
Regioni” (State-Regions Agreement), was updated in 2016. It regulates
the contents of compulsory HSE courses for HSE professionals; their
length, updating process, and certification and the authorization to be
an HSE training provider. The HSE specialist becomes an HSE profes-
sional (i.e., an RSPP) after having passed Modules A and B, the spe-
cialising course (depending on the domain), and, finally, Module C. In
short, to become an HSE professional, i.e., an RSPP, the following
length of courses are required, varying between 136 h (for the health-
care services, i.e., 28 h+ 48 h+12 h (healthcare services)+ 24 h) and
142 h (for the mining and building sector, i.e., 28 h+ 48 h+18 h
(mining and building)+ 24 h)
Further, the HSE professional has to go through 40 h of compulsory
training, over a period of every 5 years, to maintain the certification.
Table 6 summarises the plan of compulsory courses for HSE
professionals (RSPP). It shows that for the Italian legislator the HSE
professional role (i.e., the RSPP) must have both technical and rela-
tional competences. It is a valuable and ambitious approach, but it is
complex to pursue. In practice, Italian companies tend to emphasise the
technical competences to manage HSE aspects.
Providers of compulsory and voluntary courses on risks prevention
are both public and private entities. Public providers are: Ministries of
Labour, Interior, Health, and Economic Development; the INAIL; the
regional health prevention local units (SPSAL); the Italian public
management school; universities’ departments and universities’ busi-
ness and doctoral schools. Overall, Italy’s business schools offer 15
Masters in safety specialization; but only one in safety management
(i.e., the one offered by the “University of Modena and Reggio Emilia”).
Private companies (consultancy and training ones) must meet spe-
cific HSE professional standards and must have field experience to be
authorized by a single Region to provide HSE compulsory courses to
companies. Private companies provide also consultancy HSE services,
methods and tools for a complete and adequate risk prevention within
companies.
Besides, there are 2 further actors, that are neither private compa-
nies nor public institutions, which play an important role in the overall
HSE framework. These are the two main non-profit HSE professional
associations AIAS and AIFOS,9 on the one hand, and on the other hand
the “Organismi Paritetici” (Joint Bodies), which are “joint ventures”
between companies and workers’ unions (in the majority of economic
industries) established by law no. 81 (Table 5).
The Associations of HSE professionals (AIAS and AIFOS) offer HSE
courses for their associates in addition to their activities to protect and
develop HSE professionalism among their associated members.
The “Organismi paritetici”, raise funds from (and for) their workers
and company members to finance compulsory or voluntary HSE courses
for managers and workers. The contents of the courses are focused on
the prevention of all (HSE-related) risks and they satisfy the full range
of education and training needs of HSE professionals. The market also
provides consultancy services, methods and tools for a complete and
adequate risks prevention within companies.
The driving force for the fast growth of HSE education and training,
as well as for the development of HSE services market to satisfy com-
panies, are 3 specialized fairs (“Ambiente e Lavoro”, “Safety Expo”, and
“Ecomondo”), 3 safety magazines (“Ambiente e Sicurezza”, “Ambiente e
Lavoro”, “Quotidiano Sicurezza”) and some 10 business publishers that
offer specialized books on risk prevention and safety management.
6. From the HSE professional to the HSE manager
The aforementioned explanation of the Italian evolution of the HSE
system may be better appreciated by looking at the quantitative in-
dicators regarding accidents and deaths caused by unsafe working
conditions. Table 7 shows the accident and mortality rates, recorded by
the observatory “Osservasalute” of the Milan’s “Università Cattolica del
Sacro Cuore”, for the period 2000–2016.
These numbers confirm the progressive reduction of accidents and
deaths in the Italian working context. Actually, in the sixties and se-
venties of the past century, accidents were 1.5 million. In the eighties
and nineties of the same century, they decreased down to
900.000–1.000.000. Further, occupational deaths were 4.000 per year
in the sixties and nowadays are slightly above the 1.000 per year; in
2016 the recorded figure by the INAIL was 1016 deaths (INAIL, 2017),
9 AIFOS is the “Associazione Italiana Formatori ed Operatori della Sicurezza”
(Italian Association of Trainers and Safety Operators). AIFOS, similarly to AIAS,
is a regulated professional group association that carries out training and
consultancy HSE services and issuing the certificate for the “Qualità e qualifi-
cazione professionale dei servizi prestati dall'associato” (Quality and professional
qualification of the services provided by the member).
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which translates into an average of more than 4.6 deaths per day (on a
220 working days basis per year). Certainly, the figure is far better than
the one recorded in the sixties of the past century; yet the death toll is
still embarrassingly high as every single occupational death (and in-
validating injury) ought to be simply seen and perceived as un-
acceptable. This inadequate situation is confirmed by the comparison
with the European situation depicted in Fig. 3, which highlights that
Italy is still significantly above the EU-28 average.
More precisely, according to Eurostat, in 2015 Italy has recorded an
incident of 2.42 per 100.000 person employed against an EU-28
average of 1.83.
Empirical research on accidents and injuries at the workplace (made
by the Ministry of Labour, INPS, Trade Unions, as well as research
centres) explains the still negative situation from two different per-
spectives.
The technical explanation is based on safety statistics. It classifies
Italian companies into three categories:
• Outlaw, “black” companies that do not observe HSE norms, pur-
suing an opportunistic behaviour and an unfair competition based
on cost savings, the inefficiency of the inspection system, as well as
tax evasion. The most dangerous industries in Italy are the
agricultural and the building companies where the small companies
(no more than 15 employees) are the majority and they work in
outsourced activities;• Bureaucratically compliant, “grey” companies that formally observe
HSE norms, but are not able to efficiently prevent risks;• Mindful, “white” companies that consider the risk prevention and,
more specifically, the HSE area as a business activity to be managed
(to get an efficient HSE performance) according to the same criteria
as the production and sales activities.
The socio-technical explanation goes beyond figures. In general, it
assumes organizational risks are the driving determinants of the bad
HSE performance of Italian companies. Five organizational risks explain
the majority of injuries:
• The low working experience of young employees when it is not
balanced with adequate training;• The mental workload of workers due to digital interfaces that op-
erate at high speed and require fast reaction which is not prevented
or mitigated with an ergonomic design of the workplace;• The emphasis on the technological imperative in ruling hu-
man–machine interaction that imposes the need for a diligent, but
also an uncritical, behaviour based on following procedures;• The refusal to consider non-work-related elements (such as the
amount of time to reach the workplace, the personal family habits)
as contributors to unsafe behaviour at the workplace.
The common feature underlying the two approaches is the cultural
model of the company leadership: the entrepreneur for the SME; the top
manager and CEO, for the large and public company. Feng (2013, 2014)
has empirically demonstrated that a strong safety culture related to
companies in the Hong Kong building industry, explains the efficiency
of investments in risk prevention (and vice versa), measured by an ef-
ficient HSE performance. As explained in the introduction, the cultural
model to build a strong HSE orientation is the socio-technical model.
Table 6
Compulsory HSE courses for the HSE professional.
Courses Contents Length
Mod. A The basic knowledge of risk prevention and HSE legislation 28 h Total
A1 The knowledge of risk prevention and HSE legislation (Law no. 81/2008) 8 h
A2 The Knowledge of the institutional risk prevention and control systems: public actors and their functions 4 h
A3 The process of risk prevention in the enterprise 8 h
A4 The HSE organization in the company: risk evaluation, emergency management, health surveillance 4 h
A5 The knowledge of HSE information and training rights and their concrete application 4 h
Mod. B Risk evaluation and prevention techniques (minimum contents) 48 h Total
B1 Specific risk evaluation techniques and injury analysis
B2 Environment and workplaces
B3 Fire-fighting and emergency management
B4-B5 The typology of injury risks
B6 Ergonomic and organizational related risks
B7 Psychological-social risks (work-related stress, burn-out, mobbing)
B8 Physical agents
B9-B10 Chemical, carcinogenic, mutagenic and biological agents, asbestos. Risks related to narcotics, psychotropics and alcohol
B11 Risks related to particular activities (enclosed workplaces, roadside activities)
B12 The safe organization of the production processes
Mod. B Specialization sessions in addition to Mod. B (minimum contents) .
SP1 Agricultural and fishing industries risks 12 h
SP2 Mining and building industries risks 18 h
SP3 Healthcare services risks 12 h
SP4 Chemical and Petrochemical industries risks 16 h
Mod. C Basic organizational and relational competences 24 h Total
C1 HSE information and training design competences 8 h
C2 HSE integrated organizational systems (ISO 9001-14001, ISO 45001:2015, ISO 14001:2015) 8 h
C3 Relational and communicational system with HSE stakeholders (RLS, Trade Unions, competent medical doctor, HSE inspectors, etc.) 4 h
C4 Organizational wellbeing (safety culture, wellbeing, team building) 4 h
Table 7
Average of accidents1 and mortality rates for 100.000 workers.
Source: “Osservasalute”.
2000–2005 2006–2008 2009–2011 2012–2016
Accident rate 5.56933 4.59742 4.40038 3.0540
2014 2015 2016 2017
N. of accidents 663.627 637.199 636.812 635.433
2000–2005 2006–2008 2009–2011 2012–2016
Mortality rate 7.85 6.07 5.53 5.73
1 Requiring worker’s absence from workplace for more than 3 days.
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7. The Italian HSE surveillance system
The Italian HSE surveillance and monitoring system began with the
disruptive reforming Law no. 833 in 1978. With it, Italy’s State de-
centralized three functions to its Regions, specifically to their regional
health services (ASL) and environment protection (ARPA) units:
• To supply “Livelli Essenziali di Assistenza (LEA)” (minimum levels of
care services) to Italy’s regional citizens;• To manage HSE services complying with yearly defined economic
balance sheet standards;• To promote risk prevention and control the compliance with HSE
Laws (by private companies and public institutions).
More specifically, the last function was shared amongst the SPSAL,
the specialized safety unit of the ASL, the ARPA and the local unit of the
IL. The aim of the reorganization was to strengthen surveillance and
HSE inspections to compensate for the insufficiency of the controls
made by the IL. Six years later with the introduction of Law no. 758/
1994, the repressive approach changed into the “carrot and stick” one,
which is a mix of prevention and repression attitudes. The new ap-
proach (confirmed and strengthened by the Laws no. 626/1994 and no.
81/2008), which is the one still adopted today, works in the following
way.
If the inspector (a judicial policeman) finds a non-compliant con-
dition with relation to the HSE legal requirements, s/he:
• Writes “la prescrizione” (the prescription) requiring the company to
solve the identified problem (i.e., the non-conformity) by a certain
date;• Monitors, at the expiration date, whether the prescription has been
solved or not.
Should the control be:
• Positive, the inspector closes the file by fining the company (i.e.,
with a so-called administrative sanction), thus avoiding activation of
a criminal trial;• Negative, the inspector sends the (unresolved) prescription to the
Criminal Court to activate a criminal trial.
In short, the inspector (as a judicial policeman) adopts a preventive
approach for the period s/he suspends the activation of the criminal
charge and a repressive approach when the unresolved prescription is
sent to the criminal court.
This new way of HSE surveillance has the twofold beneficial effect
of reducing the workload of Criminal Courts and inducing companies to
comply with HSE legal requirement more quickly.
Law no. 149/2015 transformed the “Ispettorato del Lavoro (IL)”
(Labour Inspectorate) into a National Agency called “Ispettorato
Nazionale del Lavoro (INL)” (National Labour Inspectorate). The aim of
the Law was to overcome the fragmentation of inspection activities
among the different Institutions that act to monitor the compliance of
companies with labour contracts (social security, black practices, etc.),
and with health and safety conditions (compulsory insurances, regular
work environments, etc.), concentrating them in one agency. The aim
has yet been only partially achieved as yet, as the Agency only started
to work at the beginning of 2019: the INL will be staffed with new
appointments (1.000 persons) starting from 2019 and only the Ministry
of Labour has transferred its staff and control functions to INL. Table 8
summarises the current structure of the HSE surveillance system.
The coordination of HSE inspections began with the 5-year national
plan of the Ministry of Health. The first launched, spanning from 2014
to 2019, formulated the objectives expected to be pursued. Amongst
them, the quantitative reduction in specific occupational injuries and
Fig. 3. Eurostat Data on fatal accidents at work 2014 and 2015.
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the quantitative increase in work disease complaints to fight the black
company behaviour of concealment10 are considered to be particularly
important. Each institution (in this specific case the SPSAL and INL)
coordinates its own yearly inspection plans in each province with a
meeting twice a year (at the beginning and in the middle of the year).
The two positive points of the latest Laws (no. 149/2015 and no. 183/
2016) reforming the inspection system are as follows:
• The strengthening of the inspection staff of HSE professionals in the
INL;• The formalisation of the technical guidelines to operationalise the
national information system for occupational risk prevention, the
so-called “Sistema Informativo Nazionale per la Prevenzione nei luoghi
di lavoro (SINP)” (National Information Systems for the
Occupational Prevention).
The SINP was established by the Law no. 81/2008 and it will be
managed by the INAIL and composed by the database of the five public
institutions of Table 8. The weak point is that INPS and INAIL will keep
their inspection functions until all of their inspectors will be retired; and
this will easily cause problems for the many years to come.
The new HSE manager profile is recognised de facto by the market
(for the aforementioned reasons), but ignored de jure by all European
legislators. In Italy only the HSE professional is normed by the law, i.e.,
the RSPP), To improve the situation and valorise the profile, in 2016 the
AIAS association and a pool of large multinational companies (led by
Fiat Chrysler Automobiles – FCA), with the support of professionals
(representing different stakeholders) and university professors (in-
cluding the authors), stimulated the creation of a panel of experts. The
goal of the working group was the creation of a voluntary norm to
define, on the one hand, the knowledge, the skills and the competencies
the HSE manager has to possess, and, on the other hand, the educa-
tional and experiential framework for its qualification.
In July 2018 the voluntary norm was published as UNI 11,720 and,
to the knowledge of the authors, is the first norm at the European level
that defines both the profile of the HSE manager (in terms of knowl-
edge, skills, and competencies) and the qualification framework that is
to be associated with it (in terms of areas of knowledge, the number of
modules and their contents for each educational area, the overall
amount of educational hours, and the balance of educational hours for
each area of knowledge).
8. The structure of Italy’s voluntary norm UNI11720 on the HSE
manager
The UNI11720 took more than 2 years to be produced and published
by the UNI (Italy’s National Standardisation Body representing Italy at
the CEN and ISO organisations). The norm defines the knowledge, skills
and competencies of the HSE Manager profile as well as the framework
for its qualification.
The UNI working group, after an organisational analysis of the HSE
organisation in Italian companies, ended up with the conclusion that it
would be useful to define two types of HSE Manager profiles, namely:
• The (Senior) Operational HSE Manager;• The (Senior) Strategic HSE Manager.
Table 8
The Italian surveillance system.
Public Institution Core surveillance functions assigned by law and carried out by inspectors as
judicial policemen
Inspection organization




To combat undeclared and illegal work practices (the black labour market and its
entrepreneurs)
To monitor the correct enjoyment of contributions by retired or invalided workers
INAIL (National Institute for workers’ compulsory
insurance for occupational accidents)
To control the payment of the compulsory insurance premium against occupational
injuries and diseases by employers
National headquarter, Regional
and Provincial branches
To promote risk prevention through the dissemination of safety organizational
systems (SGSL) and best practices. INAIL stimulates employers to improve safety
conditions of their companies though the reduction of the insurance premium and
the financing of ad hoc safety projects.
INL (National agency of labour inspectorate) To carry out the same inspection functions of INPS, INAIL, SPSA. The HSE
professionals are divided in two roles: (1) the administrative experts to control the
compliance with contributions, compulsory insurances and work practices; (2) the
technical experts to inspect health and safety conditions in particular of companies
in the building and railway industries.
National headquarter and Inter-
regional branches
Corpo nazionale dei Vigili del Fuoco (National
Firefighters)
To inspect the compliance of plants, facilities and buildings (new and old ones)
with the legal fire prevention requisites.
National headquarter, Regional
and Provincial branches
To control the authenticity and updating of the fire prevention certificates (which
are renewed periodically).
SPSAL (The local specialized health prevention unit of
the Regional Health Authority - ASL)
To control the compliance of work environments to safety and hygiene laws
through inspections to companies of the province
Regional headquarter and
Provincial branches
To make surveys and research on occupational injuries and hygiene to discover
causes and find remedies
To express preventive opinions on safety and hygiene requisites of new working
environment designs.
To carry out and to coordinate medical checks and examinations on workers subject
to occupational risks and diseases using competent medical doctors
ARPA (Regional Agency for Environmental
Protection)
To inspect the compliance of plants and storage sites with the legal environmental
prevention requisites (from combating atmospheric and acoustic pollution to
interventions for the protection of surface and underground water, from monitoring




10 This is a counterintuitive goal to set; yet it starts from the assumption that
there is an existing hidden, crystallized situation of non-conformity and then
the increase in complaints would be considered as a first positive trend towards
the eradication of consolidated negative, but concealed HSE conditions.
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The Operational HSE Manager was meant as the profile that carries
out its activity in an organizational position with:
• Full decision-making autonomy in relation to the management of
operational aspects; but• Limited decision-making autonomy with reference to the strategic
aspects that are defined and decided at a higher level of the orga-
nization.
On the other hand, the Strategic HSE Manager operates in an or-
ganizational position with full decision-making autonomy with re-
ference to the strategic choices of the organization in the HSE sphere.
Its role is identified by the top management of the organization in order
to have a professional profile that can support it in defining strategic
choices and related HSE objectives. Where the organization is divided
into several organizational units, this figure can play a coordinating
role with other HSE Managers for the implementation of action plans
necessary to achieve the established HSE objectives.
The seniority (adjective “Senior”) is used to recognise the profes-
sional experience acquired both in terms of duration of the experience
spent performing the role and the growth of skills (gained through the
attendance at courses of particular relevance).
The qualification framework (equal in structure for the 2 profiles
but different in the contents) has a structure that considers the back-
ground (i.e., level of knowledge acquired through legally recognised
educational titles), the specific knowledge and its extent (acquired
through specific HSE courses with a syllabus that covers the contents
specified in the norm), the managerial experience, the corresponding
European Qualification Framework (EQF) level, as well as the re-
cognition of legally recognised extra qualifications (such as the
Philosophy Doctor programs). Table 9 shows the structure of the qua-
lification framework.
The rationale followed for the definition of the qualification fra-
mework is simple: the higher the title held, the shorter the experience
required to qualify. Thus, for example, an HSE professional holding an
Industrial PhD Diploma wanting to qualify as Strategic HSE Manager,
has to go through 7 years’ experience in HSE (given by the 10 years
required by the norm with the 3 years of exemption subtracted), 6 of
which must be spent covering managerial roles (of any type, not ne-
cessarily in HSE). Further, should the PhD path followed not be con-
sistent (in terms of contents) with the knowledge required by the norm
the candidate will have to go through a specific course (or a set of
courses), of a maximum total duration of 400 h, to fill the gap(s) (i.e.,
acquire the knowledge not acquired during the PhD experience). The
seniority (“Senior” status) will be reached after 1,5 times the length of
experience required for the non-senior profile. Thus, the Strategic HSE
Manager will become Senior Strategic HSE Manager after an overall
10,5 years’ experience in HSE. In the best case (i.e., with no interrup-




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Area of knowledge of the training modules and their relative weight in terms of
hours.











3 Occupational Safety Area 64 96
4 Occupational Health Area 64 96
5 Environment Area 112 128
Total 400 400
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The norm even specifies the macro training modules (divided into 5
areas of knowledge) with their relative weight (in terms of hours).
Table 10 summarises the 5 macro modules and their relative weight as
defined by the UNI11720 (voluntary) norm.
Finally, for each of the 5 macro modules reported in Table 10, the
norm defines even the broad contents that ought to be conveyed to the
professional. Table 11 summarises these contents.
Table 11
Broad contents for each the 5 modules defined by the norm.
Area No. Training Module Broad contents
1 Organisational-managerial Area 1. Fundamentals of work and company organization
2. Models and tools for managing human resources
3. Work relationship: basic elements of formal and informal contracts
4. Organization, management and control model pursuant to Legislative Decree no. 231/2001 (point F.4 [20]) with regard to crimes
related to the protection of health and safety at work and to environmental crimes
5. Fundamentals of dynamic systems and intra-organizational relationships (relations trade unions, inter-functional) and inter-
organizational (public regulatory bodies and external companies)
6. Theories on group dynamics and group employment techniques (for decision-making and of organizational control) and of taking
collective decisions
7. Theories and techniques of communication (public speaking, media system of the internal organizational communication, etc.)
8. Interviewing techniques
9. In-depth knowledge of the technical, technological and organizational aspects of the organizations
10. Fundamentals and models of corporate strategy in national and international competition
11. Performance of the organization and potential for improvement regarding HSE: HSE performance, safety budget, prevention
costs, performance indicators (Key Performance Indicators), social and environmental report
12. HSE performance of competing best performers in the reference market of the organization
13. Evolution and development trend of the main HSE prevention aspects
2 Administrative-judicial Area 1. The legislative system on HSE at European and national level
2. Main national and European laws on HSE and their development
3. Roles, activities and civil and criminal liability of internal and external actors in the HSE business
4. Administrative responsibility (pursuant to Legislative Decree No. 231/2001 (point F.4 [20])) and company insurance protection
(risk management strategy)
5. The activities of the supervisory bodies and internal inspection procedures (e.g., security audits) and external to the company
6. The internal and external sanctioning system and elements of criminal legislation
7. Main administrative requirements aimed at obtaining and maintaining authorizations in HSE matters
8. Fundamentals of labour law and labour relations
3 Occupational Safety Area 1. Methodologies and techniques for the analysis, evaluation and integrated management of risk, at system level, in the field of
safety at work
2. Methodologies and techniques for the analysis, assessment and management of risk in the field of safety at work
3. Prevention and protection measures (individual, collective, procedural, technical and organizational) from risks in the field of
safety at work
4. Elements of investigation techniques and monitoring of work environments (methods for monitoring and measuring chemical,
physical and biological agents and main laboratory methods)
5. Methodologies and techniques for the analysis and integrated assessment of accidents (near misses), missed accidents and injuries
6. Methods and techniques for preventing and managing emergencies
7. Fundamentals of energy and energy carrier management
8. Fundamentals of occupational psychology, behaviour management
9. Audit methods and techniques on health and safety at work
10. Main technical standards UNI, CEN, ISO, CEI, CENELEC and IEC concerning health and safety at work
11. Elements of reliability, safety and maintainability of machines and systems for the management of safety aspects and risk
containment
12. Fundamentals of statistical analysis applied to safety aspects
4 Occupational Health Area 1. Methodologies and techniques for the analysis, evaluation and management of occupational health risk
2. Fundamentals of physical, cognitive and organizational physiology and ergonomics
3. Fundamentals of occupational psychology, (social behaviour and relationships, communication and group dynamics)
4. Fundamentals of toxicology, hygiene and occupational medicine
5. Fundamentals of epidemiology and health statistics
6. Fundamentals of psycho-social risks: stress, burnout, mobbing, aging, gender differences, harassment
7. Role and method of employment (internal vs externalized) of the physician in charge of risk prevention and health surveillance
8. Methods and techniques for the prevention and management of emergencies in the field of occupational health
9. Audit methodologies and techniques in the field of occupational health
10. Fundamentals of reliability, safety and maintainability of machines and plants for managing occupational health aspects and
limiting health risk
5 Environment Area 1. Methodologies and techniques for the analysis, evaluation and management of environmental risk
2. Methodologies, techniques, technologies and facilities for managing environmental aspects and reducing environmental impact
3. Methods and techniques of investigation and environmental monitoring (methods for monitoring and measuring environmental
aspects in situ and main laboratory methods)
4. Methodologies and techniques for the analysis and evaluation of accidents and missed environmental incidents
5. Methods and techniques for prevention and management of environmental emergencies 6. Methods and techniques for
environmental remediation
7. Elements of energy and energy carrier management
8. Environmental audit methods and techniques
9. Main technical standards UNI, CEN and ISO regarding the environment
10. Fundamentals of reliability, safety and maintainability of machines and plants for the management of environmental aspects
and the reduction of environmental impact
11. Elements of environmental statistics
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9. Conclusions
Over the last century, Italy’s HSE professionals have gone through a
significant change to face both the increasing complexity of the busi-
ness and the decreasing acceptability of non-market risks (and the as-
sociated social costs of accidents and injuries at work) by European
citizens. According to Ansoff’s (1987) perspective, this requires a shift
from a “simple function orientation” (product/technology driven or
market driven) to a “multifunctional orientation” (what Ansoff defines
as the strategic or profitability ROI orientation of the company). This
practically translates into the joint optimization of market and non-
market risk prevention by top management. Yet, as Ansoff pointed out,
the most critical point in applying this shift is the required cultural
change (i.e., to become aware and understand the need to transform the
company cultural model). More specifically, from the top managers
perspective it requires the company to give up inadequate cultural
models and to prefer either the HTO model or that of the High Relia-
bility Organizations (as explained in Section 1). From the HSE profes-
sional perspective, the company orientation change requires an in-
crease in the complexity of competencies to be owned to face the
imposed challenges and to be more effective in their duties.
In Italy this change was strongly induced by a rapid evolution of the
legislative framework and the paradigm shift was given when the HSE
professional was transformed from a process/risk owner to a consultant
to the entrepreneur (and the associated line managers), thus moving the
legal responsibility of occupational accidents from the HSE professional
to the entrepreneurs/employers themselves.
To improve their effectiveness HSE professionals should have
transformed their status from that of technicians to that of profes-
sionals. Yet, this transformation would have required a market and,
with it, an adequate education offer to satisfy it. The Italian State and its
Regions understood this need and agreed to require compulsory courses
to be followed by both HSE professionals and all of those involved in
the risk prevention, namely: entrepreneurs, managers, supervisors, as
well as HSE representative of workers. Thanks to this stimulus and the
activity of the associations, a significant (public and private) market of
HSE education and services has grown over the years. Yet, despite an
adequate HSE education offer, the demand is still significantly in favour
of compulsory and updating courses, leaving voluntary courses still
perceived as a luxury and not as a profitable investment. Indeed, the
composition of the demand reveals that for entrepreneurs and their line
managers, as well as for the role’s holders (quite surprisingly), it is
difficult to leave the technician role (mindset) in favour of the profes-
sional one. This difficulty precludes the possibility for HSE professionals
to provide their most crucial and beneficial consultancy, namely: the
promotion of the HSE culture starting from the entrepreneur, going
through the managers and supervisors, to conclude with the workers.
Yet, within this apparently not really encouraging framework, the
newly conceived voluntary norm on the HSE manager (the first in
Europe), which was strongly wanted by a group of large companies (led
by FCA) and the professional associations, leaves space to hope for a
rapid transformation and improvement of the HSE marker and its as-
sociated profiles.
Appendix A. Supplementary material
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at https://
doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2019.06.002.
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95/63/CE, 97/42, 98/24 e 99/38 riguardanti il miglioramento della sicurezza e della
salute dei lavoratori durante il lavoro” (Implementation of Directives 89/391 / CEE,
89/654 / CEE, 89/655 / CEE, 89/656 / CEE, 90/269 / CEE, 90/270 / CEE, 90/394 /
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D.Lgs. n. 152/2006. “Norme in materia ambientale” (Environmental Norms).
D.Lgs. n. 81/2008. “Attuazione dell'articolo 1 della legge 3 agosto 2007, n. 123, in ma-
teria di tutela della salute e della sicurezza nei luoghi di lavoro” (Implementation of
Article 1 of the Law of 3 August 2007, n. 123, Concerning the Protection of Health
and Safety in the Workplace).
Legge n. 133/2008. “Conversione in legge, con modificazioni, del decreto-legge 25
giugno 2008, n. 112, recante disposizioni urgenti per lo sviluppo economico, la
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dell'articolo 11 della legge 29 settembre 2000, n. 300” (Regulation of the
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Legal Personality, Pursuant to Article 11 of the Law of 29 September 2000, n. 300).
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